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GARY S. BUTLER ** ***
During the past several years, the problems created by air pollution have
been given widespread attention and have been the subject of much state and
federal legislation. 1 Air pollution, however, is not a recent phenomenon2 nor
are the various remedies which exist against a polluter. At common law,
various actions were available, including the action of nuisance which
afforded a plaintiff damages for the harm caused by the pollution and, in
appropriate cases, injunctive relief against future acts causing pollution. 3 In
1970, the Illinois General Assembly enacted the Environmental Protection
Act. 4 One of the purposes of the Act was to make it easier for a person harmed
by air pollution to seek and obtain relief.5
Since its enactment, however, confusion has existed among the appel-
late districts in Illinois concerning what facts a complainant must prove in
order to meet his burden of proof. Several appellate courts have examined
certain sections of the Act and have imposed a fairly heavy burden. 6 Other
courts have examined these same sections and have come to an opposite
* Member of the Illinois State Senate from the 46th Legislative District and former Illinois Special
Attorney General-Environmental Control Section; J.D., University of Illinois.
** Senior Law Student, IIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law.
*** The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Vincent Flood, Jr., Administrative
Assistant to the Illinois Pollution Control Board and Mr. Marvin Medintz, Assistant Illinois Attorney
General-Environmental Control Section, in the preparation of this article.
1. See E. HASKELL & V. PRICE, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (1970) which analyzes
several states' pollution laws. As far as federal air pollution regulation is cpncerned, The Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. (1970) is the most important statute.
2. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-FIRST ANNUAL
REPORT (1970).
3. For a summary and explanation of the various private remedies for air pollution, seeFitzpatrick,
Private Legal Remedies to Air Pollution in Illinois, 59 ILL. B.J. 746 (1971).
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 11 1/2, §§ 1001-51 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as the Act]. It was passed
partly in response to the directive by the United States Congress in the Clean Air Act Amendments, 42
U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970) whereby each state was required to submit a plan implementing national primary
and secondary ambient air standards.
5. See note 25 infra and the accompanying text for a more complete discussion of legislative intent
behind the burden of proof provisions of the Act.
6. Processing & Books v. Pollution Control Bd., 28 I11. App. 3d 115, 328 N.E.2d 338 (1975);
Aurora Metal Processing Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 30 III. App. 3d 956, 333 N.E.2d 461 (1975);
Lonza, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 21 111. App. 3d 468, 315 N.E.2d 652 (1974).
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conclusion. Recently, however, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Processing
and Books, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board,7 not only eliminated this
confusion, but also provided an answer to the question of the function of
certain sections of the Act in enforcement proceedings before the Illinois
Pollution Control Board.
The object of this article is fourfold. First, it will compare the burden of
proof placed upon a plaintiff in the common law action of nuisance with that
imposed upon a complainant under the Act. Second, it will discuss the
conflicting decisions of the appellate courts relative to this burden. Third, the
article will examine the recent Illinois Supreme Court decision in Processing
and Books. Finally, it will explore relevant decisions of the Illinois Pollution
Control Board and attempt to show how the Supreme Court's decision will
affect future enforcement proceedings, if at all.
COMMON LAW NUISANCE
At common law, an individual harmed by air pollution could resort to the
private action of nuisance for relief. This action would lie where a person who
possessed a right in real property suffered some injury as a result of certain
types of interferences with the enjoyment of his property.8 In order for the
interference to be actionable, however, it must have been unreasonable. 9 The
test for unreasonableness adopted by the Illinois courts was whether to an
ordinarily reasonable person of ordinary habits and sensibilities the contami-
nation of the air was physically offensive to the senses and thus rendered the
enjoyment of life uncomfortable. '0 Thus, for example, in Feder v. Perry Coal
Company,"I the plaintiff stated a cause of action by alleging that defendant's
slag pile operations caused fumes and gasses to pass over onto his property,
thereby rendering his habitation uncomfortable. And, in the more recent case
of Schatz v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 2 evidence as to noxious odors, the
necessity of keeping the house closed and the interference with normal
entertainment in the home was sufficient to sustain a cause of action for
nuisance.
Under the common law action of nuisance, a plaintiff needed to show
only that the invasion of his property or the interference with the enjoyment of
7. Processing & Books v. Pollution Control Bd., 64 I1. 2d 68, 351 N.E.2d 865 (1976).
8. See generally 29 I.L.P. Nuisances §§ 1-2 (1957).
9. Feder v. Perry Coal Co., 279 Ill. App. 314 (1935). For a complete discussion of the factors
needed to maintain a nuisance action see Note, The Law of Nuisance in Illinois, 43 CHI-KENT L. REV. 173
(1967).
10. See, e.g., Patterson v. Peabody, 3 111. App. 2d 311, 122 N.E.2d 48 (1954) and Belmar Drive-In
Theatre Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Comm'n, 34 Ill. 2d 544, 216 N.E.2d 788 (1966).
il. 279 Ill. App. 314 (1935).
12. 131 Ill. App. 2d 1091, 269 N.E.2d 308 (1971), rev'd on other grounds, 51 Ill. 2d 143, 281
N.E.2d 323 (1972).
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his property was caused by the defendant and that the invasion or interference
was unreasonable to the ordinary person. The defendant, in turn, introduced
evidence on all matters which would tend to show the reasonableness of his
conduct. 13 The trier of fact would then conclude from the evidence presented
by both plaintiff and defendant whether or not the interference was suffi-
ciently unreasonable so as to sustain an action in nuisance.
The common law action of nuisance, however, was not without difficul-
ties. First, the plaintiff was required to either be a landowner or to have an
interest in land since the gravamen of a private nuisance action was founded
on an injury to land.14 Second, the Illinois appellate courts have held that a
certain amount of inconvenience from pollution was inevitable in industrial
areas. Where adjoining landowners suffered because of the operation of the
plant or factory, no recovery was allowed unless the odors or contaminations
were greater than was necessary.15 Finally, the action of a private nuisance
created a considerable financial burden on a plaintiff.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT
In 1970, Illinois adopted a comprehensive plan for the protection of the
environment with the enactment of the Environmental Protection Act. 16 One
of the unique features of the Act is that it creates three administrative bodies
which are charged with the regulation and coordination of all environmental
control activities within the state. 17
Of these three bodies, the Agency and the Board are the most important
in terms of power and authority to regulate pollution. The Agency is
empowered to investigate violations of the Act or of any regulations promul-
gated thereunder and to propose and present enforcement cases before the
Board. 18 In addition to the Agency, "any person" can file a complaint
charging a violation of the Act or any regulation.' 9 Thus, the class of those
13. The defendant would present favorable evidence on such factors as its social and economic value
to the community, priority of location in the area, suitability in the area, technological unfeasibility of
alternate methods of operation and good faith and lack of wilfulness. See generally 29 I.L.P. Nuisances §
17 (1957).
14. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Aluminum Ore Co., 224 II1. App. 613 (1922).
15. Gardner v. Int'l Shoe Co., 319 Il1. App. 416, 49 N.E.2d 328 (1943), aff'd, 386 Il1. 418, 54
N.E.2d 482 (1944).
16. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 11 1/2, §§ 1001-51 (1975).
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 1 1/2, § 1004(a) (1975) creates the Environmental Protection Agency
[hereinafter referred to as the Agency]. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 11 1/2, § 1005(a) (1975) creates the Pollution
Control Board [hereinafter referred to as the Board]. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. I 111/2, § 1006 (1975) creates the
Illinois Institute for Environmental Quality.
18. IL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, §§ 1004(e) and (f) (1975). Additionally, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11
1/2, § 1030 (1975) directs the Agency to cause an investigation upon receipt of any information of an
alleged violation of the Act or regulations.
19. hL. REv. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1031(b) (1975). Additionally, Iti. REv. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, §§
1043 and 1044 (1975) allow the States Attorney or Attorney General to seek relief in a court of competent
jurisdiction under certain specified circumstances.
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persons who can seek the abatement of pollution has been enlarged from those
having interests in real property to any individual who suffers injury because
of pollution.
The Board itself acts in a quasi-judicial fashion and conducts hearings
upon complaints brought before it. 20 This quasi-judicial power conferred
upon the Board is circumscribed by the provisions of sections 31,21 3222 and
3323 which set forth certain procedures to be employed in any enforcement
proceeding. Section 31 (c) 24 of the Act establishes the burden of proof which a
complainant must meet in order to make out a prima facie case against the
respondent. The section provides:
In hearings before the Board under this Title the burden shall be on the
Agency or other complainant to show either that the respondent has
caused or threatened to cause air or water pollution or that the
respondent has violated or threatens to violate any provision of this Act
or any rule or regulation of the Board.
In his discussion of this section of the Act its draftsman, Professor David P.
Currie, the first Chairman of the Board, states:
[T]he intention of these burden of proof provisions was to simplify the
task of prosecution by requiring the complainant to show harm...
and by leaving it to the polluter. . . to show that he cannot reasonably
be expected to comply.25
A complainant may charge a respondent with a violation of section 9(a)
26
itself or of a regulation adopted by the Board pursuant to sections 1027 and 27.28
Where the complainant alleges a violation of section 9(a), difficulties arise.
Section 3(b) of the Act defines air pollution as "the presence in the
atmosphere of one or more contaminants in sufficient quantities and of such
characteristics and duration as to be injurious to human, plant or animal life,
to health, or to property, or to unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment of
life or property." ' 29 A problem is created by the use of the word
"unreasonable" in defining what type of interference constitutes air pollu-
tion. As noted above in the discussion of the common law action of
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1005(d) (1975).
21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1031 (1975).
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1032 (1975).
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1033 (1975).
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1031(c) (1975).
25. D. CVuu, CASES AN MATERIALs ON POLLUTION 134 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Cutum].
26. lu. REv. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1009(a) (1975) reads:
No person shall:
Cause or threaten or allow the discharge or emission of any contaminant into the environment in
any State so as to cause or tend to cause air pollution in Illinois, either alone or in combination
with contaminants from other sources, or so as to violate regulations or standards adopted by the
Board under this Act.
27. IL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1010 (1975).
28. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1027 (1975).
29. IL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1003(b) (1975).
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nuisance, 30 the term "unreasonable" was defined in a certain way and certain
evidence was required in order to prove that an interference was unreason-
able. How the term "unreasonable" should be interpreted in the Act,
however, is unclear. Much of this uncertainty is derived from the language of
section 33(c) which provides:
In making its orders and determinations, the Board shall take into
consideration all the facts and circumstances bearing upon the reason-
ableness of the emissions, discharges, or deposits involved including,
but not limited to:
(i) the character and degree of injury to, or interference with the
protection of the health, general welfare and physical property of the
people;
(ii) the social and economic value of the pollution source;
(iii) the suitability or unsuitability of the pollution source to the
area in which it is located, including the question of priority of location
in the area involved; and
(iv) the technical practicability and economic reasonableness of
reducing or eliminating the emissions, discharges or deposits resulting
from such pollution source. 3
Section 33(c) sets out four factors which have a bearing upon the
"reasonableness" of an interference by a respondent. This raised a basic
question: was a complainant required to present evidence on all four of these
factors and that all four must be resolved in its favor in order to make out a
prima facie case of air pollution? Or was it sufficient, as Professor Currie
states, 32 that the complainant show only some sort of "harm" in order to make
out its case in chief and let the respondent then offer favorable evidence on the
four factors in an attempt to show that the interference was reasonable and
therefore did not amount to air pollution? In other words, what was the
function of the section 33(c) factors in an air pollution enforcement
proceeding?
Additionally, if the section 33(c) factors were not elements of a com-
plainant's burden of proof in an air pollution case, what facts was he required to
show in order to make out a case? The Illinois appellate courts have been in
conflict on these questions. Several cases have held that the four section 33(c)
factors were necessary elements of a complainant's burden of proof while
others have held that they were not. The next section will examine some of
these cases.
30. See note 9 supra and the accompanying text.
31. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1033(c) (1975).
32. CURRIE, supra note 25, at 134.
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SECTION 33(c) CONSTRUED As NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF A COMPLAINANT'S
CASE-IN-CHIEF
The Appellate Courts for the Second and Third Districts have held that
the complainant has the burden of presenting favorable evidence on the
section 33(c) factors in order for it to make out a case that the respondent has
unreasonably interfered with the enjoyment of life or property. In the Second
District case of Processing and Books, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board,
33
Processing and Books was found guilty of operating its egg farm in violation
of section 9(a) of the Act. Conflicting testimony was offered in the hearings
before the Board as to the source and the unreasonableness of odors of chicken
manure and burnt chickens which emanated from the farm. Processing and
Books offered evidence tending to refute the Agency's evidence of the source
of the emissions as well as the testimony relative to its financial investment,
expense of relocation, suitability of the present site and the financial feasibil-
ity of alternate processing methods. The Board found that Processing and
Books had violated section 9(a) and imposed a fine.
On appeal to the appellate court, Processing and Books urged reversal of
the Board's order on the grounds that its decision did not take into account the
four section 33(c) factors.The court found that the Board's written opinion
only considered section 33(c)(i) dealing with the character and degree of the
interference and did not indicate that any of the other three factors had been
taken into account.3 4 The court found this to be understandable, since the
Agency did not offer any evidence on two of these factors. The court held that
"[b]y failing to introduce evidence on each criteria of section 33(c), the
agency failed to meet its burden of proof."
3
This interpretation of the necessary elements of a complainant's case
was further developed in the later case of Aurora Metal Company v. Pollution
Control Board,36 where the Agency brought a complaint before the Board,
charging the petitioner with violating section 9(a) of the Act by discharging
phenolic odors, sand particles, and fragments so as to unreasonably interfere
with the enjoyment of life and property. In its opinion, the Board considered
only section 33(c)(i) and it failed to mention the other three section 33(c)
factors. The Agency, in fact, had offered no evidence relative to the criteria
enumerated in sections 33(c)(ii) and (iv). Aurora Metal presented evidence on
section 33(c)(iv) by showing that it was making a sincere effort to reduce and
eventually eliminate the emissions, but the Board concluded that even if the
33. 28 Il. App. 3d 115, 328 N.E.2d 338 (1975), rev'd, Processing & Books, Inc. v. Pollution
Control Bd., 64 I11. 2d 68, 351 N.E.2d 865 (1976).
34. 28 111. App. 3d at 118, 328 N.E.2d at 341.
35. Id.
36. 30 I11. App. 3d 956, 333 N.E.2d 461 (1975).
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company were successful in this respect, new odor problems might be
created.
The appellate court reversed the Board's order and set aside its fine on
several grounds. First, it found that the Board's statements concerning the
creation of new odor problems was not supported by the record. No evidence
was adduced which supported the claim that by the company's method of
reducing emissions a new odor pollution might be created.37 Second, by
failing to present any evidence on sections 33(c)(ii) and (iv), the Agency did
not meet its burden of proof in showing that the petitioner had unreasonably
interfered with life or property."
In support of its holding, the court reasoned that the essential elements of
proving a violation of "unreasonable interference" were proof that first, the
respondent caused or allowed particular emissions, and second, that such
emissions were unreasonable. In order to prove the second element, the court
held that a complainant must offer evidence on each of the four section 33(c)
factors since it is this section of the Act which outlines".., the reasonable-
ness of . . . emissions . . .
The Appellate Court for the Third District adopted two opposing
positions on the question of the relation of the section 33(c) factors to a
complainant's burden of proof under the Act, holding first that the factors
were not part of a complainant's case-in-chief, and later, that they were. In the
early case of CM Ford v. Environmental Protection Agency,1° Ford sought
review of an order in which the Board found it guilty of violating the Act by
the operation of a solid refuse disposal site, and imposed a fine of $1,000. On
appeal, Ford contended that the Board failed to comply with section 33(c) of
the Act. Ford argued that this section required the Board to hear evidence on
all four factors and that the section placed a burden on the complainant in the
enforcement proceeding to introduce evidence on each of these factors. 41 Ford
urged the reversal of the Board's order on the ground that except for a finding
that the continued maintenance of the dump would create a public hazard, the
evidence in the case showed that the Board did not take into consideration the
section 33(c) factors.
In rejecting these contentions, the court examined sections 33(c) and
31 (c) of the Act. First, the court noted that the burden is on a complainant to
prove a violation of a provision of the Act. 42 Then, leaving unanswered the
37. Id. at 960, 333 N.E.2d at 465.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 9 Ill. App. 3d 711, 292 N.E.2d 540 (1973).
41. Id. at 720, 292 N.E.2d at 546.
42. Id.
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question of what facts must be shown by the complainant in order to meet this
burden, the court merely stated that once the complainant has shown such a
violation, the burden is on the respondent to show that compliance with the
Board's orders or regulations would impose an arbitrary or unreasonable
hardship. 43 In order to prove such a hardship, the respondent may offer
evidence on each of the section 33(c) factors. The court said that where such
evidence has been presented by the respondent, it is incumbent on the Board
to consider it before entering any orders or making any determination. Where
the respondent, however, fails to present any evidence on the four factors, the
Board is not required to consider them in reaching its decision.'
The court's holding in Ford was short-lived. In Lonza, Inc. v. Pollution
Control Board,45 Lonza was found guilty of violating section 9(a) of the Act
by discharging certain contaminants from its facilities. The Board found that
these unreasonably interfered with the enjoyment of life and property. The
Agency presented the testimony of four residents who lived near the petition-
er's facilities. The Board found Lonza guilty of causing air pollution and
imposed a fine.
On appeal, Lonza argued that the evidence presented in the proceeding
was insufficient to support the finding that it violated the Act. In responding to
this argument, the court first examined section 3(b) of the Act and found that
this section created a two-pronged test for determining whether a respondent
caused or threatened to cause air pollution. The respondent's emissions must
cause injury to human, plant or animal life, and they must also unreasonably
interfere with the enjoyment of life or property.4 Reference must be made to
the four section 33(c) factors in order to determine whether the interference
with life or property is unreasonable. The court then concluded that because it
is the duty of the complainant to prove that the respondent caused air
pollution, and because a necessary prerequisite to a showing of air pollution is
proof of the section 33(c) factors, a complainant must introduce evidence
relative to all of these factors in order to sustain its burden of proof. 47 The
court then found that the Agency had failed to meet its burden under section
31(c).
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Second and Third Districts treated
section 33(c) factors as the necessary elements of a complainant's case. In
43. Id. at 720-21, 292 N.E.2d at 546.
44. Id. The Appellate Court for the First District, in Mystik Tape, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 16
I11. App. 3d 778, 306 N.E.2d 514 (1973), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 60 I11. 2d 330, 328 N.E.2d 5
(1975), specifically chastized the Third District for this holding. And, in Incinerator, Inc. v. Pollution
Control Bd., 59111. 2d 290, 319 N.E.2d 794(1974), such a reading of section 33(c) was disapproved. See
text at note 75 infra.
45. 21 111. App. 3d 468, 315 N.E.2d 652 (1974).
46. Id. at 471, 315 N.E.2d at 654.
47. Id. at 472, 315 N.E.2d at 655.
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reaching this result, these courts employed a three-step reasoning process.
Initially a complainant has the burden of proving that the respondent
unreasonably interfered with the enjoyment of life or property. Because
section 33(c) sets forth four factors which the Board must consider in
determining the reasonableness of the respondent's activities the complainant
must offer evidence on each of these factors in order to make out its case of
unreasonable interference. The courts in the other appellate districts, how-
ever, disagreed with this reasoning process, as will be shown in the next
section of this article.
SECTION 33(c) As A BURDEN FOR THE RESPONDENT AND THE BOARD
The appellate courts in the First and Fourth Districts (and to a certain
extent the Fifth District) took an opposite view from that of their counterparts
in the Second and Third Districts on the question of the burden of proof. Their
position may be summarized as follows. Although the plaintiff must of course
prove that the respondent's emissions unreasonably interfered with the
enjoyment of life or property, the section 33(c) factors are not necessary
elements of the complainant's burden of proof. The courts in these districts
have not specified, however, what the elements of the complainant's burden
are. The section 33(c) factors are items of mitigation. Evidence concerning
them must be presented by the respondent or known by the Board through its
own expertise. Where the respondent fails to present evidence on all of the
factors, the Board must nevertheless consider them before it can determine if
respondent's interference was unreasonable.
The following discussion will show what types of interferences have
been held to be unreasonable and how, in certain cases, the Board's
consideration of the section 33(c) factors has relieved a respondent of
monetary penalties even though it found that respondent's emissions
unreasonably interfered with enjoyment of life or property. 48
48. The problems involved where neither party before the Board presents evidence on one or more
factors is only touched upon in this paper. See text at note 92 infra. The cases which have been and will be
discussed involve situations where evidence on all four factors has been presented so that the court upholds
the Board's order or where evidence has been presented on every factor but the court finds that it is
insufficient to support the Board's finding on a particular factor. For an example of the latter situations, see
C.P.C. International v. Pollution Control Bd., 32 I11. App. 3d 747, 336 N.E.2d 601 (1975), discussed at
note 60 infra.
Where neither party presents evidence on a certain section 33(c) factor, the Board is empowered to
subpoena such documents and books as it may need to make a finding on the missing factor, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1005(e) (1975). Additionally, the Board, as a practical matter, takes "quasi-judicial
notice" of certain data which are relevant on certain section 33(c) factors. On this point see the discussion
of the Board's treatment of the section 33(c) factors at note 80 infra and the accompanying text. Finally, a
private conversation with Mr. Vincent P. Flood, Jr., an Administrative Assistant to the Illinois Pollution
Control Board, revealed that in certain instances the Board will construe a certain factor against a party who
has evidence on that factor in its possession and does not come forward with it.
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The Appellate Court for the First District has decided several cases
concerning a complainant's burden of proof where the respondent was
charged with violations of section 9(a) of the Act. In Mystik Tape, Inc. v.
Pollution Control Board,4 9 Mystik Tape sought review of the Board's order
which found a violation of section 9(a) and imposed a fine. At the hearing
before the Board, the Agency introduced the testimony of several neighboring
residents who said that they had noticed odors coming from Mystik's facilities
on several occasions. These witnesses variously characterized the odors as
"sharp, acrid, smelling like burning adhesive," "sweet" or similar to
"rubber or burning rubber." The Board stated that although the emissions did
not cause any property damage or force anyone to seek medical attention, they
nevertheless interfered with the comfort and enjoyment of life of the nearby
residents, constituted a nuisance, created a burden on the community and,
therefore, violated section 9(a) of the Act. 0 Even though extensive testimony
was introduced by Mystik relative to its social and economic value, priority of
location and absence of any technologically and economically feasible
alternatives, the Board found it guilty and imposed a fine.
The First District Appellate Court set aside the Board's order, basing its
decision on two grounds. First, the testimony elicited at the hearing failed to
show that the witnesses suffered any harm to either person or property.
Additionally, no witness testified that he was forced to curtail any of his
normal daily routines or activities. 5 ' The court found that evidence of the mere
noticing of an odor, without more, is insufficient to support a specific finding
that a respondent's emissions unreasonably interfered with the enjoyment of
life or property. 52 Second, the Board's opinion did not indicate that it had
taken into account the factors outlined in sections 33(c)(ii), (iii) and (iv) or the
evidence presented by Mystik relative to them.53 The court stated that section
33(c) set forth both the meaning of and the basis for a finding of unreasonable-
ness, and that the Board must consider these factors before it can find that a
respondent's emissions were unreasonable. 4
In Mystik Tape the court found that the complainant failed to prove its
case against Mystik. This finding, however, was based, in part, upon the
failure of the Agency and its witnesses to show any harm or interference.
49. 16111. App. 3d778, 306N.E.2d574(1973), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 60111. 2d330, 328
N.E.2d 5 (1975). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of the case see note 74 infra.
50. Environmental Protection Agency v. Mystik Tape, Inc., 6 Ill. P.C.B. 503 (1973).
51. 16 II. App. 3d at 803, 306 N.E.2d at 594.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 799, 306 N.E.2d at 591.
54. Id. At first glance it may appear that by stating that section 33(c) provides the meaning of the
term "unreasonable" the court follows the position of the courts for the Second and Third Districts. As
discussed below, however, later decisions of the First District apparently reject any such position. See note
55 infra and the accompanying text.
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Moreover, the court did not find that the Agency failed in its burden because it
failed to introduce evidence on the factors contained in sections 33(c)(ii), (iii)
and (iv).
The decision in Mystik Tape is an example of a situation where a
complainant failed to prove a case of unreasonable interference with its
activities. In Chicago Magnesium Casting Company v. Pollution Control
Board,5  the First District Appellate Court again examined the complainant's
burden of proof. Chicago Magnesium was found guilty of emitting sulphur
into the air so as to cause discomfort to several nearby residents.
Evidence introduced during the hearing showed that at the time of the
emissions, no other process was technologically available for petitioner other
than the one which it employed and which allowed the sulphur to escape.
Some time after the period of the violations and considerably before the
Agency brought its complaint before the Board, a new process was perfected
which eliminated the emission of sulphur. Chicago Magnesium adopted this
new process and thereby curtailed the emissions.
On appeal, the First District Court upheld the finding of the Board that
Chicago Magnesium caused pollution in violation of section 9(a), but the
court vacated the fine.16 In taking this action, the court rejected Chicago
Magnesium's argument that if it is not technologically practical or economi-
cally feasible to reduce or eliminate pollution, there can be no finding of a
violation of the Act .57 Rather, the court stated that these were only two factors
which, by themselves, were not determinative of the question whether a
respondent's emissions caused an unreasonable interference.8
In Chicago Magnesium, the complainant met his burden of proof by
introducing evidence that the suphur emissions caused physical discomfort.
The case differs from Mystik Tape in which the only testimony presented
showed that the complainant's witnesses noticed odors which had no more
effect than to cause the witnesses to "wrinkle up" their noses. 59 Thus,
physical discomfort would appear to meet the standards of the complainant's
burden of proof under section 31(c). Additionally, the court in Chicago
Magnesium rejected the idea that the section 33(c) factors are the elements of
proof of a complainant's case-in-chief. The court upheld the Board's determi-
nation that Chicago Magnesium caused air pollution in violation of Section
9(a) of the Act and at the same time it vacated the order imposing the fine. In
doing this, the court apparently interpreted the words "orders" and "deter-
55. 22 I11. App. 3d 489, 317 N.E.2d 689 (1974).
56. Id. at 495, 317 N.E.2d at 694.
57. Id. at 493, 317 N.E.2d at 692.
58. Id.
59. 16 Il. App. 3d 778, 802, 306 N.E.2d 574, 593.
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minations" in section 33(c) as relating solely to those orders and determina-
tions which the Board may make once the fact of a violation has been found
and not to the finding of a violation in the first instance. Although the court
rejected Chicago Magnesium's argument that a favorable finding on 33(c)(iv)
relieved a respondent of liability for causing air pollution, it did vacate the
fine imposed by the Board since Chicago Magnesium had no practical
alternative to allowing sulphur emission and, once such an alternative method
was developed, it was installed by the company. 60
The Fourth District, as well as the First District, took the position that the
section 33(c) factors did not constitute the elements of the complainant's
case-in-chief. In Sangamo Construction Co. v. Pollution Control Board,
6'
Sangamo was found guilty of violating section 9(a) of the Act. At the hearing
before the Board, several businessmen, whose offices were located in close
proximity to Sangamo's concrete and asphalt plants, testified that odors
which emanated from these plants interfered with the daily operation of their
businesses sometimes causing them to send employees home early and at
other times causing the employees to feel nauseated. Other businessmen
testified that the emission of dust was so severe at times that they were forced
to curtail certain painting operations.
All of the testimony introduced indicated that when Sangamo's facilities
were not in operation, these problems ceased. Evidence relative to the social
and economic value of the pollution source was introduced. It showed that
60. Chicago Magnesium's conduct in the operation of its facility obviously indicated a good faith
effort on its part to comply with the Act. Besides this fact, however, the decision shows how a favorable
finding on one factor can keep the Board from assessing any penalty.
One other First District decision merits attention since it shows the scope of the inquiry which the
Board must make into the section 33(c) factors. In C.P.C. International v. Pollution Control Bd., 32 I11.
App. 3d 747, 336 N.E.2d 601 (1975), C.P.C. was found guilty of violating section 9(a). In its opinion, the
Board indicated that it took into account the testimony of both residents of the area in which the plant
operated and of experts relative to the effects of the emissions and evidence concerning the size of the plant,
its physical characteristics and the number of persons employed there. This latter testimony was taken in an
apparent attempt to satisfy the requirements of section 33(c)(ii) dealing with the social and economic value
of the pollution source. In reversing and remanding the case to the Board for further consideration, the
appellate court found that the testimony introduced concerning section 33(c)(ii) was not sufficient in that
the Board did not inquire into the potential hardships which would be imposed upon the company by any
cease and desist order entered by the Board. Additionally, there was no statement in the opinion showing
that the Board had considered any evidence relative to the suitability of the location of the plant to its area or
any testimony concerning the feasibility and availability of alternate ways of discharging particles from its
operations. The court stated that although there is evidence in the recordrelative to each of the section 33(c)
factors, the court cannot, without a clear indication in the Board's opinion that such factors were
considered, determine what evidence, if any, meets the standards of the section. Id. at 752, 336 N.E.2d at
603. The decision thus indicates that the Board's findings on the section 33(c) factors should be fairly
specific. On this point, see Incinerator, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 59 I11. 2d 290, 319 N.E.2d 794
(1974), where the Board's findings, although not as specific as they could have been, were nevertheless
upheld, the court expressing a caveat that in the future it would expect more specificity in the Board's
opinion relative to the section 33(c) factors.
61. 27 IIl. App. 3d 949, 328 N.E.2d 571 (1975).
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Sangamo had closed down both plants and had laid off its employees.
Furthermore, it had no plans to reopen one of these plants. Additionally, the
Board found that the absence of any nearby residences was a mitigating
circumstance in favor of Sangamo. On the question of technological feasibil-
ity, the Board found that although Sangamo had installed various pollution
control devices, the installation was an afterthought and should have been
done when the plants were first constructed. On that record, the Board held
that Sangamo had caused air pollution in violation of section 9(a) and it
imposed a $5,000 fine.
The Appellate Court upheld both the Board's finding of a violation of
section 9(a) and its imposition of the fine. The court held that the testimony
elicited before the Board concerning the damage caused by Sangamo's
emissions was sufficient to enable the complainant to meet its burden of proof
under section 31 (c). 62 Thus, the disruption of neighboring businesses and the
accompanying curtailment of their normal operations constituted ample
unreasonable interference so as to sustain a finding that Sangamo caused air
pollution.
The court was somewhat unclear, however, on the question of the
function of the section 33(c) factors. First, it stated that the factors were
relevant guides to the Board in determining whether a respondent emitted
contaminants which not only unreasonably interfered with the enjoyment of
life or property but which also were injurious to human, plant or animal life,
to health or property. 63 Second, the court found that section 33(c) acted as a
guarantee against any arbitrariness on the Board's part. 64 Finally, as the First
District Court in Chicago Magnesium found, the Fourth District Court in
Sangamo held that a favorable finding on one factor (here, the suitability of
the pollution source to the area in which it was located) would not insulate a
respondent against a finding of a violation of section 9(a). By affirming the
Board's finding of a violation where the complainant did not present evidence
on every section 33(c) factor, the court in Sangamo adopted the view that the
62. Id. at 955, 328 N.E.2d at 576.
63. Id. at 953, 328 N.E.2d at 575. This case expands on the holding in Incinerator, Inc. v. Pollution
Control Bd., 59 I11. 2d 290, 319 N.E.2d 794 (1974), in which the supreme court held that section 3(b) of
the Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1003(b) (1975), created two types of pollution: that which causes
injury and that which unreasonably interferes with the enjoyment of life or property. The court held that the
section 33(c) factors were relevant to the proof of only the latter type of pollution. Id. at 296, 319 N.E.2d at
797. The appellate court in Sangamo held that section 33(c) was relevant to the proof of the injurious type
of pollution. The supreme court has yet to hold this.
64. 27 111. App. 3d at 953-54, 328 N.E.2d at 575. The court, in reaching this conclusion, apparently
picks up on the language of the supreme court in City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Bd., 57 111. 2d 170,
182-83, 311 N.E.2d 147, 152 (1974) which states that section 33(c) acts as a safeguard against any
arbitrary or capricious imposition of fines by the Board.
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four factors do not constitute the necessary elements of a complainant's
case-in-chief.
65
The above discussion has examined the views of those appellate districts
which have taken the position that the introduction of evidence on the section
33(c) factors is not required of a complainant in order for it to meet its burden
of proof in a case- charging that a respondent's emissions unreasonably
interfered with the enjoyment of life or property. Some general observations
can be made as to the views of the First and Fourth Districts concerning both
what the complainant must prove and the function of section 33(c). First, a
complainant need not introduce evidence on every section 33(c) factor in
order to sustain its burden of proof under section 31 (c). Second, to make out a
case, evidence of more than just recognition of odors or contaminants must be
presented. Testimony of physical discomfort, interruption of normal business
activities and the curtailment of business functions has been sufficient to
allow the Board to find that the complainant has met its burden under section
3 1(c). Finally, the preceding discussion has shown how the courts in at least
the First and Fourth Districts have held that the section 33(c) factors are items
of evidence which the respondent must introduce in order to mitigate or avoid
any penalties which the Board may impose. Thus, even though the Board may
be justified in finding that a respondent has caused pollution, consideration of
section 33(c) may militate against the imposition of a fine. It is clear that the
position of the appellate courts in the First, Fourth (and possibly the Fifth)
Districts was completely opposite to that taken by the Second and Third
Districts.
65. The Appellate Court for the Fifth District has not decided a case which has discussed the question
specifically raised in this article. It has, however, discussed section 33(c) in several non-air pollution cases.
For example, in Cobin v. Pollution Control Bd., 16 111. App. 3d 958, 307 N.E. 2d 191 (1974), Cobin was
found guilty of violating section 9(c) of the Act, IL. Rav. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1009(c) (1975), which
prohibits open burning. The court upheld the Board's finding since it was convinced that the four factors
had been considered by the Board. The court also held that a favorable finding on one factor did not
preclude the Board from finding a violation of section 9(c). 16 Ill. App. 3d at 965, 307 N.E.2d at 196. In
Freeman Coal Mining Corp. v. Pollution Control Bd., 21 Ill. App. 3d 157, 313 N.E.2d 616 (1974), the
court held that the Board was not required to make express findings on or to require proof by the Agency
relative to each of the section 33(c) factors. Id. at 170, 313 N.E.2d at 626. The case, however, involved a
charge of causing water pollution which is defined in IL. RaV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1003(n) (1975) as
follows:
WATER POLLUTION is such alteration of the physical, thermal, chemical, biological or
radioactive properties of any waters of the State, or such discharge of any contaminant into any
waters of the State, as will or is likely to create a nuisance or render such waters harmful or
detrimental or injurious to public health, safety or welfare, or to domestic, commercial,
industrial, agricultural, recreational, or other legitimate uses, or to livestock, wild animals,
birds, fish, or other aquatic life.
The importance of these two decisions lies in the inference they suggest that section 33(c), by being a
relevant guide in cases where "unreasonable" is not involved in defining a violation of the Act or a
particular type of pollution, has nothing to do with the complainant's burden of proof. In fact, the courts
which employ the section 33(c) factors in non-unreasonable interference situations view the factors as
items which a respondent may introduce in its own defense.
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THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN Processing and Books v.
Pollution Control Board
The conflict among the appellate districts concerning the elements of a
complainant's case-in-chief under the Act was finally settled by the Illinois
Supreme Court in Processing and Books, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board. I
The court reversed the decision of the Second District Appellate Court ,67 and
held that a complainant is not required to introduce evidence relative to all
four section 33(c) factors in order to meet his burden of proof under section
31(c). In reaching this decision, the court examined section 3(b) of the Act
and found that the use of the word "unreasonable" created problems in
deciding what facts a complainant must prove in order to make out his
case-in-chief. Additionally, the court looked at its prior decision in
Incinerator, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board" where it had held that a
complainant bore the burden of persuasion on the essential elements of the
offense charged. The supreme court, in Processing and Books, rejected the
holding that the section 33(c) factors were the elements to be proved by a
complainant. The court stated that such an interpretation of section 3(b)
would place a more stringent burden on a complainant than it would bear in a
common law nuisance action. 69 However, it would also frustrate the purpose
of the Act which is to establish a unified system of enhancement and
restoration of the quality of the environment. 70
The decision in Processing and Books states what the elements of a
complainant's burden of proof are not. Does it help to determine what they
are? The court answers this question when it states:
In our opinion the word "unreasonably" as used in section 3(b)
was intended to introduce into the statute something of the objective
quality of the common law, and thereby exclude the trifling inconveni-
ence, petty annoyance of minor discomfort. 71
It would thus appear that the test for unreasonableness under the Act is the
same as that in a common law nuisance action: Whether to a person of
ordinary habits and sensibilities the contamination of the air was physically
offensive and rendered the enjoyment of life or property uncomfortable .72 The
role of the section 33(c) factors in a case before the Board now becomes
clearer. In a common law action of nuisance, a plaintiff made out his case by
showing that the defendant had unreasonably interfered with the enjoyment of
life or property. The defendant then had an opportunity to present evidence in
66. 64 Ill. 2d 68, 351 N.E.2d 865 (1976).
67. 28 11. App. 3d 315, 328 N.E.2d 338 (1975).
68. 59 II!. 2d 290, 319 N.E.2d 794 (1974).
69. 64 Ill. 2d 68, 351 N.E.2d 865 (1976).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See note 10 supra.
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mitigation of its conduct. 71 Such evidence included the social and economic
value of the pollution source, the suitability of the pollution source to the area
where it was located, and the lack of ability or finances to develop other less
offensive methods of operation. Based upon both the plaintiff's and defend-
ant's evidence, the jury could decide whether the interference was so
unreasonable as to warrant an award of damages.
The section 33(c) factors, then, are merely the statutory equivalents of
the defenses available to a party in an action for nuisance. After a complainant
has made out a case of unreasonable interference, the burden of presenting
evidence relative to the section 33(c) factors falls upon the respondent. If the
respondent presents such evidence, the Board must weigh it along with the
complainant's evidence to determine if a fine or other action is warranted.
74
What if the respondent fails to adduce evidence on the section 33(c)
factors or introduces evidence on some but not all of them? The Illinois
Supreme Court in Incinerator held that the Board must consider these factors
and indicate that it has done so by specifically stating the facts and reasons
leading to its decision. 75 In Processing and Books the court did not discuss this
question. Therefore, if there is no evidence, or insufficient evidence is
adduced, can the Board make a determination that the respondent caused air
pollution, or impose a fine on him?
The Board takes notice of facts known to it through its own expertise and
makes findings on section 33(c) factors even when a party before it has failed
to present evidence on them. The next section of this article will be devoted to
an exploration of the Board's "notice."
SECTION 33(c) As CONSTRUED BY THE BOARD
One question which results from the decision in Processing and Books is
whether the Board's own construction of section 33(c) is in accord with the
holding of the Illinois Supreme Court. As will be seen, the Board's practice is
already in accord with Processing and Books.
73. See note 8 supra and the accompanying text for a discussion of the common law nuisance action.
74. 59 111. 2d 290, 296, 319 N.E.2d 794, 797 (1974). In Mystik Tape, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd.,
60 I11. 2d 330, 328 N.E.2d 5 (1975), aff'g inpart and rev'g in part, 16 11. App. 3d 778, 306 N.E.2d 574
(1973), the supreme court reiterated its position that the unreasonableness of a respondent's emissions
must be tested against the four section 33(c) factors. The court agreed with the appellate court that the
Board has not considered all of the factors. However, the court remanded the case to the Board for further
consideration of evidence on section 33(c). 60 11. 2d at 338, 328 N.E.2d at 9. In S. Ill. Asphalt Co. v.
Pollution Control Bd., 60 11. 2d 204, 326 N.E.2d 406 (1975), the court held that section 33(c) created
relevant standards which the Board must consider in mitigation or aggravation when determining what
action to take, if any, against a respondent. The court also commented, "We have recently held that the
provisions of section 33(c) establish the criteria for determining an unreasonable interference with the
enjoyment of life or property as that phrase is used in section 3(b) of the Act." 60 Ill. 2d at 208, 326 N.E.2d
at 408 (citation omitted).
75. 59 II1. 2d at 296, 319 N.E.2d at 797.
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The Board has taken different positions on the question of what function
section 33(c) has in its decisionmaking process. In one early decision,76 the
Board stated that air contaminant emissions were unreasonable where there
was proof of an interference with life and property and that economically
reasonable technology was available to control the emissions. Several subse-
quent opinions adopted this definition.7 7 The Illinois Supreme Court, in
Mystik Tape78 expressly disapproved of this definition, stating that it omitted
consideration of the other section 33(c) factors. Thus, the Board was forced to
develop an alternate test for "unreasonable."
The approach which the Board now takes to the section 33(c) factors can
be illustrated by its decision in Citizens for a Better Environment v. North
Elmhurst Sanitary District.79 The Board's opinion summarized the testimony
of six persons who resided near a sewage treatment plant owned and operated
by the respondent. All of the evidence showed that because of poor operation
of the plant, respondent caused odors to escape into the air. Such odors caused
the witnesses to stay indoors, to keep their windows closed, to curtail the use
of their pools and patios and disrupted their outdoor parties. Respondent
showed that the plant was too small for the job it was intended to do and that it
planned to shut the facility down and pump the sewage to its main plant.
The Board found that the improper operation of the plant unquestionably
resulted in a violation of section 9(a), based upon the testimony of the
witnesses and the injuries and inconveniences caused by the odors.80 Only
after it made this finding did the Board then state that in reaching its
conclusion it had examined the section 33(c) factors. The Board concluded
that although a sewage treatment plant has great social and economic value
when properly run, improper operation which causes pollution diminishes its
value. As to the question of priority of location, the Board stated that the fact
that the respondent was in the area before the complaining witnesses were
does not constitute a license to pollute. Moreover, even if the plant was suited
to the area where it is located, an improperly operated plant is unsuitable to
any area. Finally, respondent was already engaged upon a course of action to
eliminate the odors. Thus, the Board found that technologically feasible
alternatives were available to the respondent. Because respondent was taking
steps to eliminate the odors, the Board imposed no penalty, but did prescribe a
time limit for the completion of a pumping station.
76. Moody v. Flintkote Co., 2 II1. P.C.B. 341 (1971).
77. See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency v. Chicago Housing Authority, 4 111. P.C.B. 145
(1972), Environmental Protection Agency v. American Generator and Armature Co., 3 II1. P.C.B. 373
(1972) and Employees of Holmes Bros. v. Merlan, 2 111. P.C.B. 405 (1971).
78. 60 I11. 2d 330, 337-38, 328 N.E.2d 5, 9 (1975).
79. 17 II1. P.C.B. 387 (1975).
80. Id. at 393.
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Several interesting observations can be made about this case. First, the
only evidence which the complainant introduced was the testimony of
residents of the area concerning the degree of interference caused by respond-
ent's emissions. The complainant introduced no evidence relative to the
factors set forth in sections 33(c)(ii), (iii) and (iv). Furthermore, the record in
the case is silent as to exactly what evidence the respondent presented except
that the treatment plant was inadequate and was being phased out of
operation. The Board, nevertheless, made specific findings relative to the
section 33(c) factors. It first found that an improperly operated sewage
treatment plant loses its social and economic value since it causes rather than
abates pollution. 8' This conclusion by the Board was apparently based upon
its own perception and expertise and not upon evidence presented by the
parties in the case.
Second, the Board stated that an improperly operated sewage treatment
plant was unsuitable to any area. 82 This was an apparent attempt to satisfy
section 33(c)(iii) although the respondent offered no evidence on this point.
Again the Board used data from its own experience and knowledge in order to
make a specific finding on one of the factors. Finally, the Board noted that the
respondent had already undertaken an economically and technologically
feasible alternative to polluting by constructing a new sewage pumping
station. 83 Thus, the respondent's own admissions permitted the Board to make
a finding on the section 33(c)(iv) criteria.
Other Board decisions take an approach similar to that in North Elmhurst
Sanitary District."4 In one recent opinion, however, the Board appears to
adopt the rule laid down by the Second and Third Appellate Districts that a
complainant must present evidence on all four section 33(c) factors. In People
of the State of Illinois v. North Shore Sanitary District and City of Highland
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 394.
84. An interesting issue involving noise pollution, as defined in section 24, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I ll
1/2, § 1024 (1975), was presented in Buelo v. Barrington Sportsmen Unlimited, Inc., and Environmental
Protection Agency v. Barrington Sportsmen Unlimited, Inc., 16 Ill. P.C.B. III (1975), two cases
consolidated before the Board. Evidence showed that the complaining witnesses could not engage in
normal outdoor activities while the respondent's members were engaged in skeet-shooting and hunting.
The Board found that the respondent caused noise pollution. In reaching this decision, the Board stated that
a complainant had a much stricter burden of proof than under the common law action of nuisance. It then
held that in order to make out a prima facie case, the complainant must show that there has been an
interference and that the interference was unreasonable. And in determining whether the interference was
unreasonable, the Board-must use the section 33(c) guidelines. Id. at 115. In Buelo, the Board was faced
with the unrefuted allegations of the complainant. The respondent offered no contradictory evidence. The
Board considered the factors relative to priority and suitability of location and social value but it concluded
that since no evidence was presented on them by the respondent, the complainant had made out a prima
facie case. Id. at 115.
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT
Park v. North Shore Sanitary District,85 two cases which were consolidated,
the Board stated that a complainant's burden of proof in showing an
unreasonable interference is fourfold. The complainant must establish that
there was an odor, that it came from respondent's facilities, that the odor
caused an interference and that" . . . such interference [was] unreasonable,
such unreasonableness being measured, in part, by the criteria in section 33(c)
e86 Board then examined the testimony of complainant's witnesses
and found that the evidence that the odors unreasonably interfered with the
enjoyment of life or property was sufficient to find a violation of section
9(a).87 In defense, the respondent relied only upon the Board's findings in a
prior case88 that its site was the most suitable one available and that a sewage
treatment plant has a great deal of social and economic value to the
community. The Board held that this evidence did not preclude a finding of a
violation.
Although the Board stated that the complainant must prove that an
interference was unreasonable by reference to the section 33(c) factors, the
complainant's evidence in North Shore Sanitary District touched only on
section 33(c)(i). 89 Evidence on the other factors was either introduced by the
respondent or quasi-judicially noticed by the Board. Thus, where no evidence
is presented on a particular factor, the Board employs its own knowledge and
expertise to fill the gap. The Illinois Supreme Court in Processing and Books
did not express an opinion as to the permissibility of such a procedure. It
merely held that the evidence presented by both parties before the Board was
sufficient to support a finding that the respondent caused air pollution. 9 The
court noted, however, that the Board's opinion was handed down before its
decision in Incinerator, Inc., and therefore a lack of specificity in its findings
was allowed. 9' Additionally, the supreme court found that the Board in
Processing and Books had considered all of the section 33(c) factors even
85. Il1. P.C.B. 74-223 and Ill. P.C.B. 74-229 (consolidated) (November 6, 1975).
86. Id. at 6.
87. The Board summarized the testimony in a chronological order on a day by day basis. The
witnesses called by the Agency were residents of Highland Park who lived near respondent'sClavey Road
plant. The witnesses generally testified that the odors generated by the plant caused them to abandon
outdoor activities, to cancel or curtail patio parties and at times to almost be nauseated. Some of this
testimony was corroborated by "log books" of the respondent which noted that certain operational
breakdowns occurred at the same times as complaints of odors were made. Other testimony consisted of
reports of the police department which investigated complaints from various residents concerning the
odors. Some of these reports, however, were unsupported by other testimony and were, therefore, found to
be insufficient to sustain a finding of a violation.
88. League of Women Voters v. North Shore Sanitary Dist., 1 111. P.C.B. 369 (1971).
89. One possible explanation for the Board's statement that the complainant has the burden of
proving the unreasonableness of a respondent's emissions by means of the section 33(c) factors is that this
case, if appealed, would be heard by the Appellate Court for the Second District since the cause of action
arose in Highland Park, Lake County. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 1 1/2, § 1041 (1975).
90. 64 Ill. 2d 68, 351 N.E.2d 865 (1976).
91. Id.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
though, as stated by the appellate court, the parties had not presented evidence
on each one. 9 Impliedly, then, the court would allow the Board to use its own
knowledge and expertise in arriving at a finding on the section 33(c) factors
where the parties themselves do not present evidence on these factors.
CONCLUSION
This article has examined the decisions of the Illinois appellate and
supreme courts, and those of the Illinois Pollution Control Board in order to
determine what a complainant must prove to make out a prima facie case of air
pollution. The confusion on this point among the appellate districts has been
resolved by the Illinois Supreme Court in Processing and Books, which held
that the complainant need not offer evidence on every section 33(c) factor in
order to make out his case-in-chief. This decision will substantially ease the
burden on a person who seeks the abatement of air pollution. First, as the
supreme court pointed out, the decision reverses those courts which would
place a more stringent burden of proof on a complainant than he would have
had in the common law action of nuisance. 93 Second, the decision brings the
92. The appellate court's decision was based on the fact that the parties had not presented evidence
on all 33(c) factors, Processing & Books, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 28 111. App. 3d 115,
118, 328 N.E.2d 338, 340-41 (1975).
93. See note 13 supra and the accompanying text for a discussion of the burden of proof in a nuisance
action. The position of the Second and Third Districts would have posed an additional problem. The whole
idea of an enforcement proceeding is that the question of whether a person caused or threatened to cause air
pollution should be decided in an adversary context, wherein one party presents evidence showing the
unreasonableness of the other party's conduct and the other party introduces evidence showing that its
conduct was reasonable under all of the circumstances. Ideally, a complainant would present evidence
which would tend to show that not only did the respondent's conduct unreasonably interfere with the
enjoyment of life or property or cause physical discomfort but that it was also unreasonable in light of the
four section 33(c) factors. In many cases, however, requiring the complainant to present evidence on all
four factors would be tantamount to forcing it to present evidence which would tend to disprove the very
fact which it is attempting to prove. For example, where the respondent's operations have very little social
or economic value (or where the respondent has made no good faith efforts to comply with the Act) the
complainant will not be prejudiced by being required to introduce this evidence since the lack of economic
or social value (or of good faith) will strengthen a case of unreasonableness.
Where the pollution source, however, has social and economic value, the complainant must introduce
evidence of this value. Thus, it will be presenting evidence tending to disprove the very fact it wants to
prove, namely that respondent's emissions were reasonable in light of its social and economic value. The
objections to requiring a complainant to present evidence tending to prove and, at the same time, disprove
its case are pointed out by the Agency and the Board in Respondents'-Petitioners' Petition for Leave to
Appeal to the Supreme Court at 15, Processing & Books, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 28 Ill. App. 3d
115, 328 N.E.2d 338 (1975):
It is highly unlikely that, in this context, evidence of reasonableness presented by the
complainant will be as comprehensive as that presented by the respondent. The complainant will
understandably only attempt a cursory presentation of evidence of reasonableness so as to meet it
Processing and Books "burden of proof."...
• . . [N]o respondent would be expected to be satisfied with the job his opponent has done for
him. Invariably, the respondent would proceed to put on all available evidence of the
reasonableness of the emission in a far more complete and persuasive manner. That part of the
complainant's case which purports to introduce evidence of reasonableness is illusory and of no
value in presenting that issue in a manner which will be of any aid to the trier of fact in making a
determination according to section 33(c). Therefore, to require the complainant to introduce
evidence as to all of the factors of section 33(c) is a duplicitous and meaningless task which
would serve only to unnecessarily lengthen and confuse the proceedings.
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burden of proof sections of the Act in accord with the intent of the legisla-
ture.94 Third, it restores the legislative goals of providing a statewide program
of restoration and enhancement of the environment and placing the adverse
effects of pollution squarely on the polluters. 91 Finally, by its holding that a
complainant is not required to introduce the equivalent of an environmental
impact statement, the court recognized that effective pollution control
depends upon an uncomplicated enforcement procedure which insures fair-
ness to all parties.
94. Cu~iaE, supra note 25, at 134.
95. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. I11 1/2, § 1002(b) (1975).
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